THE Viet Nam war has divided and demoralized
the American people as have few other issues in this century.
It led, on March 31, to Lyndon Johnson's renunciation of the presidency
in the realization that he might well have been defeated for
reelection. Its steadily growing cost was perhaps the greatest single
obstacle to Johnson's hopes of building a Great Society for the U.S. in
its cities, countryside and classrooms. The war's ugliness, and the
often misunderstood reasons behind U.S. participation in it, greatly
contributed to the rebelliousness of America's young. More than
anything else, it has been Hubert Humphrey's identification with the
President's war policy that has cost him Democratic and independent
support throughout the election campaign. Thus it came as the supreme
irony of the Johnson Administration that, as Americans prepared to go
to the polls this week to vote for another President, the agony of Viet
Nam appeared about to be alleviated. In a televised address to the nation that may rate as the high point of
his career, the President announced: “I have now ordered that all air,
naval and artillery bombardment of North Viet Nam cease,” effective
twelve hours after he spoke. “What we now expect—what we have a right
to expect—are prompt, productive, serious and intensive negotiations.”
When those negotiations resume in Paris this week, the morning after
the U.S. elections, representatives of both the Saigon government and
the Viet Cong are expected to take part—though Johnson emphasized that
the Communists' participation “in no way involves” U.S. recognition of
the Viet Cong's political representatives. Johnson gave no hint of
what, if any, concessions Hanoi offered. Presumably there was some quid
pro quo, but in order to spare Hanoi embarrassment among its allies,
most notably Peking, the U.S. may keep the specific terms secret as
long as possible. Still, the President made it clear that if North Viet
Nam takes advantage of the pause—such as massive violation of the
Demilitarized Zone or the shelling of cities—the U.S. will not hesitate
to resume the bombing. “We could be misled—and we are prepared for
such a contingency,” he said. More than any other phase of the Viet Nam war, the bombing of the North
aroused emotional opposition both in the U.S. and abroad. But ending
it was not an easy decision. By holding back the U.S. bombers, Johnson
risked repudiating a major element of his own policy. But he also
assured his reemergence, in his final months in office, from under the
war's clouds. With a Micrometer. Johnson's decision was of the kind few outgoing chief
executives have ever had to face.
It was complicated immensely by the closeness of the election; he had to
judge whether a halt would help Humphrey or be considered a cynical
ploy. All the same, when he announced a partial bombing halt last March
31, and simultaneously renounced a second term in office, his
popularity rating spurted 13 points. Were Humphrey's standing in the
polls to increase by even a third of that amount, his already growing
chances to overtake Richard Nixon in the presidential race might be
materially enhanced.
