For 13 chilling days in October 1962, it seemed that John F. Kennedy and
Nikita S. Khrushchev might be playing out the opening scenes of World
War III. The Cuban missile crisis was a uniquely compact moment of
history. For the first time in the nuclear age, the two superpowers
found themselves in a sort of moral road test of their apocalyptic
powers.The crisis blew up suddenly. The U.S. discovered that the Soviet Union,
despite repeated and solemn denials, was installing nuclear missiles in
Cuba. An American U-2 spy plane came back with photographs of the bases
and their support facilities under construction: clear, irrefutable
evidence. Kennedy assembled a task force of advisers. Some of them
wanted to invade Cuba. In the end, Kennedy chose a course of artful
restraint; he laid down a naval quarantine. After six days, Khrushchev
announced that the Soviet missiles would be dismantled.The crisis served some purposes. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have had
no comparable collision since then. On the other hand, the humiliation
that Khrushchev suffered may have hastened his fall. The experience may
be partly responsible for both the Soviet military buildup in the past
two decades and whatever enthusiasm the Soviets have displayed for
nuclear disarmament.Now, on the 20th anniversary of the crisis, six of Kennedy's men have
collaborated on a remarkable joint statement on the lessons of that
October. It contains some new information, particularly in Point Eight,
and at least one of their conclusions is startling and controversial:
their thought that, contrary to the widespread assumption of the past
two decades, the American nuclear superiority over the Soviets in 1962
had no crucial influence with Washington or Moscow at the time—and
that in general, nuclear superiority is insignificant.The authors are Dean Rusk, then Secretary of State; Robert McNamara,
Secretary of Defense; George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Roswell
L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Theodore Sorensen, special
counsel to the President; and McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to the
President for national security affairs. Their analysis:In the years since the Cuban missile crisis, many commentators have
examined the affair and offered a wide variety of conclusions. It seems
fitting now that some of us who worked particularly closely with
President Kennedy during that crisis should offer a few comments, with
the advantages both of participation and of hindsight.FIRST: The crisis could and should have been avoided. If we had done an
earlier, stronger and clearer job of explaining our position on Soviet
nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere, or if the Soviet government
had more carefully assessed the evidence that did exist on this point,
it is likely that the missiles would never have been sent to Cuba. The
importance of accurate mutual assessment of interests between the two
superpowers is evident and continuous.
