The story in TIME this week on Egypt's political convulsions involving
Mohammed Naguib and Lieut. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser came as no real surprise to the editors in New York−nor will it
to the TIME readers who have followed the recent stories on Egyptian
politics. The reason was some perceptive, hard-digging reporting by
TIME'S Jim Bell, now in Bonn, Germany after a three-year tour in the
Middle East.As early as last April, when most people still considered Naguib the
real power in Egypt, Bell was the first reporter to flatly identify
Nasser as the driving force in Egypt's new regime. Cabled Bell: “When
the British sit down with the Egyptians for the Suez evacuation talks,
they will find the key man isn't Mohammed Naguib or Foreign Minister
Fawzi. Instead, the big gun will be Gamal Nasser . . . Have interesting
biography and anecdotes on Nasser, who is about due recognition for
what he is . . .”The result of this was TIME'S two-column story on Nasser,
which described him as “a lean young field officer, just turned 35, who
does not even hold Cabinet rank. Lieut. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser is
becoming the real power in Egypt's military junta−more important even
than Naguib, the reluctant dictator.”Bell first began to suspect that Nasser was the man to watch shortly
after the coup d'etat of July 23, 1952. Says Bell: “We started hearing
the phrase El Bekbashi constantly around army headquarters. El Bekbashi
wanted this done . . . has ordered . . . Bekbashi means lieutenant
colonel in Arabic. El Bekbashi was obviously a big man, but we didn't
know who he was. It was not until late summer that we learned that El
Bekbashi was Nasser.”During early fall we began hearing Nasser's name more and more. He led
debate over outlawing the Wafd Party. When you went to Naguib's office,
you noticed that every visitor and every piece of paper went first to
Nasser in a small, nearby office before reaching Naguib himself.
Gradually, as it became obvious that other members of the Revolutionary
Council deferred to him, we became convinced that Nasser was the
regime's No. 2 man. It became apparent about this time that Naguib was
spending so much time kissing babies and other public-relations chores
that he had little time for running the government.”In January 1953, Bell reported: “There is an uneasiness in the air in Cairo
which becomes apparent after a few days to anyone who has felt Egypt's
uneasiness in times past. It is hard to pin down because, despite the fact
that the officers get around in public, they have isolated themselves from
newsmen . . . The cause for this uneasiness is the increasing number of fights in the
Officers' Committee itself, where the inability of the new regime to
get anything done−except on paper−toward solving Egypt's basic
problems is making tempers short. There have always been arguments
among the officers, but of late they have been sharper, more basic. So
far, they've ended up in agreement, but agreement is becoming harder
and harder to get. The thing that's causing the trouble is that some officers, led
generally by Lieut. Colonel Gamal Nasser, are impatient with the moderates, led generally
by Mohammed Naguib . . .”
